Abstract. Service Oriented Architectures (SOA) have been identified as a suitable mediator towards the attainment of the requirements imposed by modern warfare. Earlier studies focused primarily on the strategic domain, or the adaptation of such systems to the requirements of the tactical domain. Yet, the underlying constraints are significantly different between the two, with direct impact both on security and quality of service. In this article we approach the security aspect of tactical SOA, focusing on the specifics of the services while operating under the constrains and requirements of modern battlefields. Selected elements of our analysis within the project TACTICS are presented, as they have been utilized for the extraction of operational and technical requirements towards the development of a suitable tactical service infrastructure.
Introduction
Military operations are dependable on maintaining interoperability across the strategic and tactical domains. The strategic domain is commonly stationary or deployable, with over-provisioned infrastructure that supports elements such as headquarters, air combat command, intelligence command, mission control centres and medical treatment facilities. Contrary to that, the tactical domain is based on mobile infrastructures of Adhoc nature supporting the communication requirements of the deployed units within the context of a tactical operation and across a given AoO (Area of Operations). The military units that must be served by the tactical SOA are commonly expected to be at levels equal or lower to a brigade, while tactical operations are commonly executed at the level of a company, platoon or section. Such operations present significant variations in terms of the AoO environment, expected mobility patterns, deployed assets, available resources, required services, information exchange models and mission subobjectives. Yet, a tactical service oriented architecture must enable service provisioning across these variations, allowing the support of mission specific objectives according to established security and quality of service requirements.
Tactical networks bear some similarities to commercial Mobile Ad-hoc (MANET) and mesh networks. Yet, due to their military orientation, they differentiate over a multitude of characteristics including the utilised technologies, their set of requirements and the imposed constraints. The introduction of NEC (Network Enabled Capability) and cal Ad-hoc networks present distinct sets of constraints and requirements, due to their unique operational and architectural characteristics. Thus, they must be distinctly investigated focusing primarily on the attainment of requirements imposed by tactical operations. Bass et al. [15] suggested a qualitative risk analysis method for complex network centric military operations. The authors focus on operations where information superiority is critical, analysing basic information assurance concepts and suggesting a risk management methodology for defence in depth. Kidston et al. [16] provided a generic study in respect to threat mitigation in tactical networks. The authors assessed the significant differences between commercial and tactical networks, supporting that, despite the similarities, security analysis and solutions cannot be considered a priori transitive within the two. Furthermore, the authors proposed a cross-layer security framework for the attainment of the corresponding security requirements.
Jacobs [17] provided a thorough examination of the adversary types, along with the corresponding threats they pose, towards a war-fighter information network. The author categorised the adversaries to spies, traitors, intelligent agents, information warriors and hostile soldiers, analysing each category in terms of expertise, access, backing and risk tolerance. Additionally, an overview of cryptographic methods has been provided, towards the mitigation of system vulnerabilities. Burbank et al. [18] evaluated the use of MANETs towards the realisation of the requirements of network centric warfare. Although the main focus of this study is not related to security aspects, the authors provide a thorough presentation of the requirements of tactical networks and the capabilities of current technologies towards their realisation.
Wang et al. [19] evaluated some of the security challenges and goals of tactical MANETS, suggesting a hierarchical security architecture for communication security management across large scale tactical Ad-hoc networks. Additionally, Kidston et al. [20] presented a cross-layer architecture for network performance optimization, according to their analysis over system specific quality of service requirements. As presented earlier the requirements of NEC and NCW, promoted the use of service oriented architectures, for enabling such capabilities across tactical networks [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] Yet, the field has not been studied in depth from the scope of security, or the operational assumptions do not coincide with the realistic constraints of the modern battlefield. Setting the services as the core element of tactical networks, within the constrained nature of the operational environments and infrastructures, impose a unique set of security requirements which we seek to identify and analyse within this study.
Asset Identification and Categorization
As stated earlier, the goal of this study was to define operational and technical requirements with security related impact, for the deployment of services across tactical SOA. Identifying and categorising the available assets, including the developed services, allowed the mapping and analysis of functional, transitive and symmetric interactions across them. This initial step is crucial for the identification of transitive risk propagation across the assets, and the analysis of mitigating measures from the perspective of the developed services. AS-01, Personnel: According to the preservation of life requirement, the personnel involved in an operation is the asset of utmost criticality. This applies both to the decision making commanding officers, and, within the context of tactical operations, primarily to the network users deployed across the AoO. AS-02, Information: Tactical SOA rely on the utilisation of cross-layer information for the establishment of the environmental context by defining objects, activities, and relations. In this context information assets have been categorised as:
1. AS-02.1, System specific: Information that relate to the TSI architecture, such as: AS-3, Software: Software within a tactical SOA refers to the operating system and the deployed TSI architecture. Military systems commonly utilize commercial operating systems, such as Linux, Microsoft Windows or OS-X. Yet, some special purpose domains are developed over operating systems specialised for military embedded systems. The TSI architecture refers to a set of core and functional services deployed across the tactical nodes in order to provide all the required mission and system-specific functionalities (e.g. unit positioning, medical evacuation alert, logging, session management, access control, information filtering/labelling). AS-4, Hardware: Hardware resources refer to the deployed terminals. It must be noted that within tactical networks highly diverse platforms are deployed, referring to ground, air, naval, deployed unmanned and satellite communications. Despite the diversity of these platforms in terms of capabilities, constraints, requirements and mobility, interoperability must be guaranteed for the support of the required functionalities. AS-5, Network: Network resources are a critical asset within the constrained environment of tactical networks, since they directly affect the aforementioned elements through the information dissemination, service choreography and resource allocation processes. In that sense network resources refer not only to the available bandwidth, but also to a variety of other elements that may effect service delivery, such as computational capacity, battery level, packet queue size, memory size and radio range. Figure 1 presents the model of interactions across the identified assets, that has been developed and used during the next steps of our analysis. Software/Services (AS-03) are consumed by other services, and by the process of Personnel (AS-01) consuming or generating Information (AS-02). Furthermore, Service consumption can generate and consume Information, but also consumes Hardware (AS-04) and Network (AS-05) resources (which as a process also generates information).
An example of how the model has been used in the next steps of our analysis (in conjunction with the identified threats and requirements), can be extracted by the used scenarios as follows: The team leader of a section (AS-01) generates a medical evacuation alert message (AS-02), with the use of the MEDEVAC functional service (AS-03). In this scenario, the TSI must be developed according to technical specifications that allow the satisfaction of security requirements not only across the direct action path (e.g encryption and integrity protection of the MEDEVAC request), but also on potential transitive paths, such as:
-Information leakage through the transitive consumption of other services (e.g. Distributed service registry, QoS Handler-Through the message prioritization process). 
Analysis of Transitive Threat Impact for Tactical SOA
As presented earlier, the threats imposed to commercial and tactical networks have been thoroughly analysed in existing bibliography. Yet, for the purpose of this study it was critical to identify transitive relationships, in order to define technical requirements that could minimize security related risks. The selected basis of our analysis was ENISA (European Union Agency for Network and Information Security) threat taxonomy [30] . Thus, filtering threats related to SOA across tactical environments, and identifying the affected assets in conjunction with the model presented in section 3, allowed the mapping of transitive impact propagation. The identified interactions can be seen in An example of the scenarios used for this analysis, can be extracted in respect to the "Loss of stored information" threat. Internal sources of the threat are identified in AS-01(misuse), AS-03(software failure), and AS-04(equipment failure). The direct impact is located in the lost information itself, while high transitive impact is traced at the assets consuming information (AS-01 and AS-03). Yet, low transitive impact can be traced to AS-04 and AS-05, since recapturing (or requesting retransmission), and reprocessing the lost information, will require the consumption of hardware and network resources in an already constrained network.
Identified Operational Requirements
Setting the services as the core network element instead of the radio links, impose a unique set of requirements and vulnerabilities, that necessitate the incorporation of additional elements into the security paradigm of currently developed tactical architectures. In this section we aim to filter and analyse these elements that are specific to the service architecture and require the development of specialized controls or the suitable adaptation of the existing. Within the TSI, the deployed services obtain the role of network entities. In this sense the available core and functional services must be treated not only as network resources that can be invoked by the users, but also as agents that can consume resources on their own right, such as bandwidth and other services.
Consequently, in this section we attempt a mapping of the functional requirements that emerged from our study, for the mitigation of the aforementioned threats, to well established and generic security requirements. This approach has been selected because thorough technical details of existing (such as those deployed at the strategic domain) or currently developed (aiming at the tactical domain, such as TACTICS TSI) military SOA, have not or can not be fully disclosed. It must be noted that approaching this topic from the perspective of services, does not exclude but is complementary to generic and information centric security requirements, as described earlier [1] , while transitive dependencies also apply.
1. Availability: It does not only refer to information, but also the means to process these (meaning the deployed services), which must be available at the time they are required directly or transitively. Availability of information is generally understood in the sense of timeliness, which does not necessarily imply any particular speed of processing, but rather depends on the specification of a deadline. If no such deadline exists, the information must be available on demand, which may be considered a stronger requirement. For code and services, the goal of availability formulates a metric identifying the ability to process information and provide functionalities. For realistic tactical systems, availability is closely related to reliability and is often expressed as a probabilistic metric. In reliability theory, availability expresses the degree to which a system is in a specified operable and committable state during a mission, when it is called for, at an unknown (modelled as random) time. This fraction is often described as a mission capable rate (0 to 1). 2. Confidentiality: A service must not disclose information to unauthorised entities (including other services) allowing the deduction of its state. This does not explicitly establish confidentiality between principals or services. Depending on the required granularity this may be achieved in the simplest case (however approximately) through access control mechanisms, but otherwise may require formulation over explicit information flows. We also note that information flows under nondeductibility are not limited to the deliberate exchange of information. As an example consider the use of radio frequencies which allows the observation of the fact that services communicate in a transitive manner, regardless of encryption or even traffic flow confidentiality. Similarly the use of a name service or service registry that is itself not kept confidential can allow the deduction of information regarding the internal state of the principal. 3. Control: Services must not relinquish possession of protected functionalities. This implies protection against tampering or the possibility of tampering within transitive or delegated service invocations. Such capabilities, including service substitution, are fundamentally required within tactical SOA. Yet, at each step of such invocation links, control must be maintained and reassured. Applying the notion of trust within this context, operations on information must only be performed if the service performing the operation can be believed to act in the interest of the service providing the data to be processed. In a more generic but equally significant approach, a service must be capable of initiating processing in a trusted state. 4. Integrity: The TSI must not allow information flows that may have been subject to modification by services at different levels of integrity than the originating principal. This is realised typically at different levels for data and services. For data, detecting whether any modification has occurred, and possibly the originating service of such modification, is a necessary component. Particularly for services, integrity can be shown at the level of identity, but as data may also be subjected to transformations either at the syntactical or even at the semantic level. This requires a clear understanding of metrics other than non-modification. Additionally, integrity may be considered as axiomatic or be represented by trust in a service, modelled explicitly either dynamically or statically. We note that integrity may be called into question when modification is possible rather than on demonstrating that it has occurred in actual fact. Furthermore, modifications must also map omission or suppression of information, rather than only differences between a received or stored copy of information and the original. 5. Authorisation: All service functionalities on or affecting protected information (direct, transitive or delegated service invocations) must be subjected to authorisation. This is an indirect prerequisite for accountability and information-related protection. It must be noted that information flows and modifications may arise from local state change or previous and subsequent operations, requiring explicit consideration of such processing as part of the set of operations to be controlled. 6. Authenticity:Authenticity is a property that may again refer to information and services, and must not be confused with authentication, since it refers to obtaining proof or a relative metric to verify a claim either of origin or, more generally, of the provenance of a datum after processing. Authenticity can be proven ephemerally, but may also need to be verified after longer time periods have elapsed. In the former case, the proof or measure of authenticity exists for the duration of an interaction among services, whilst in the latter the proof or measurement must be stored or transported, and is itself the subject of protection. Where authenticity is to be shown over longer time periods, the notion of time or ordering must typically be included explicitly since violations of integrity of a datum or services operating on data may invalidate authenticity, or give rise to claims that data is not authentic. 7. Authentication: All information processing entities must be uniquely identified and authenticated. This is primarily required for accountability, but is also implicitly required in confidentiality and integrity protection mechanisms for information at the processing level. 8. Traceability and Non-repudiation: An unbroken chain must be retained documenting the provenance and transfer of information across all services, ensuring the inability of a principal to deny that a datum was generated, transferred or modified. The above can also be formulated positively in terms of requiring a service that provides proof of the integrity and origin of data, including the authenticity of this assertion with high assurance, where the integrity and authenticity must be possible to maintain without the cooperation of the principal whose datum is the subject of the non-repudiation proof. This is largely supported by integrity and authenticity assurance mechanisms, but requires additional information to be retained for each service involved in an information flow.
Identified Technical Requirements
The presented results of our theoretical analysis, allowed the identification of technical requirements, towards the architectural development stage of TACTICS. The identified requirements of high criticality for the mitigation of the aforementioned threats include: 1. Service definition according to standard formats, (e.g. XSD, WADL, WSDL) ensuring interoperability with the existing subsystems deployed within the strategic domain, and coalition operations. 2. Any implemented service invocation processes must support existing protocols, (e.g. SOAP, WSIF) ensuring interoperability with the existing subsystems deployed within the strategic domain, and coalition operations. 3. End to end dynamic service discovery and delivery must be supported across multiple domains. 4. Edge proxy functionality must be supported, in order to allow suitable and secure translation of messages and services. 5. Support a variety of message exchange schemes (anycast, broadcast, multicast, unicast) for dissemination of policy critical updates and service management/invocation. 6. A distributed and best-effort updated service registry/repository must be provided, in order to enhance service availability.
-During service discovery, a consumer must be able to identify all the reachable services/providers according to the defined security policy privileges. 7. Support of a dynamic and capable of preconfiguring publish/subscribe exchange pattern. 8. Support of store and forward functionality. 9. Support of bandwidth reservation functionality.
10. Service substitution and delegation must be conditionally supported, not only within the same or neighbouring nodes, but also within allied forces.
-This also applies for the security services including policy mechanisms. 11. The service discovery mechanism functionalities are independent of other core services and, within the TSI, constrained only by the security policy.
-Externally, the service providers available resources must also be taken into account. 12. Required services and policies can be added or updated on-line, during the mission execution stage, given that the needed resources become available.
-This should also be feasible using an unmanned operational node (e.g. UAVUnmanned Aerial Vehicle) 13. Suitable mechanisms must be established in order to allow message prioritization both for system and mission specific messages. (e.g. security policy updates, dynamic attribute dissemination (trust levels), mission alerts).
-Similarly, prioritization in congested environments must be allowed for the exposure of high criticality services. 14. The TSI supports a variety of overlay/underlay routing protocols, in order to allow adjustments according to user mobility and disruptions, utilising and/or maintaining multiple routes. 15. Security management and service protection is established at multiple levels and variable granularity within the SOA stack 16. The TSI can include a variety of core services, which are deployed across the tactical nodes at the mission preparation stage, according to node capabilities and mission requirements.
-The minimum set and most lightweight versions of core services deployed in a tactical node must allow service discovery, message exchange and security. This would allow the stand alone operation of the node within is-landed or heavily congested environments. 17. Service dedicated access control, integrity protection, confidentiality, provenance assurance and trust management mechanisms are established within the security policy, as discrete network entities, as presented earlier. 18 . Service features are evaluated and adapted dynamically to network and node resources, as well as user requirements, according to service performance indicators and SQM (Service Quality Management).
Conclusions
The constraints of tactical networks impose significant limitations to the realization of suitable SOA based solutions. Overcoming these limitations, while maintaining the enforcement of security requirements for the protection of the deployed assets is a critical task. In this article we presented our analysis and results in respect to the secure deployment of services, as the means to process information and provide functionalities in tactical SOA. Analysing the interactions across the identified assets within preestablished scenarios, allowed the identification of potential transitive risk propagation paths. Focusing on the services as the main agent of such systems, operational and technical requirements have been established towards the development of a secure tactical service infrastructure. It must be noted again that approaching this topic from the perspective of services, must be enforced as complementary to generic and information centric security requirements, as described in our earlier studies.
